Econimic Philosophy: The True Aims of Business

Health care reform debate is in the air. I thought I'd write a more theoretical post on what I take to be the critical underpinnings of this debate, so please don't expect things like statistics and numbers, I don't really do those.

I'll start with a discussion on business teleology. What does teleology mean? Coined by Aristotle, the wikipedia entry defines teleology or telos as: the philosophical study of design and purpose. So when I suggest that we'll be looking at the telos of business I'm merely indicating that we'll look at a broad understanding what the aims of business is, set in the context of health care.

Real quick, there's another term I'm going to be throwing around: ontology. Another Aristotelian word defined by wikipedia as: the philosophical study of the nature of being, existence or reality in general, as well as of the basic categories of being and their relations, i.e. in order for a quality of a thing to be considered an ontological quality it must in some way define the thing. That is, without this ontological quality a thing is not recognizably what we define it to be. So, an ontological quality of a hydrogen atom is that it only contains one electron. If an atom has more or less than one electron then it is not a hydrogen atom.

So, what are the teleological and and ontological qualities of a business? For starters a business aims to make a profit. This would be an ontological quality, if an organization aims at something other than making profit, then it is not a business. The teleology of a capitalistic business is to make as much profit as possible. These two things are quite obvious and it seems silly to lay them out like this, but it's important to do so. In summation, a business, in the broadest sense has two very basic aspects: to make a profit and to make as much of a profit as possible.

Another thing to go over real quick is the difference between means and aims. Think of your favorite company, I am partial to Apple Computers, I like their products. Apple is in the business of making quality computers and computer equipment. I shop at Whole Foods which is in the business of providing high quality and premium groceries. I buy video games at Gamestop which is in the business of stocking a wide selection of new and used video games. Each one of these companies employ different means all of which designed to satisfy the same aim: to make as much profit as possible.

The point I'm driving at is this: all businesses, regardless of means, aim for one, and only one thing: profit. Apple Computers, Whole Foods, and Gamestop are moneymakers FIRST! Their products are secondary considerations designed only to achieve their primary aim. This is a dangerous situation. As anyone who's seen Food, Inc. recently can attest to, companies have an incentive to lower the quality of their products and services if it serves their aim the best. So, McDonald's and Whole Foods share a common aim, NEITHER business is in the business of feeding people, they're only in the business of turning profit, that's it, end of story.



What does this have to do with health care? Well, our country's health care system has been in the hands of private interest for some time now. Our country's health care system is a business. Saving lives and keeping people healthy is the means. So have we experienced a "McDonaldizidation" of our health care, wherein the quality of the product is sacrificed for an increase in profit? That's for you to decide I suppose. There's piles of evidence for and against this question. Rather than wade through all that crap, just look at the theoretical aspect of the question.

Is health care, currently, a business?
Yes.

Do businesses have an ontological and teleological incentive to reduce the quality of their means if it increases their profits?
Yes.

Further, is a business that maximizes its profits a better business than one that does not?
Yes.

Are businesses willing to sacrifice the quality of human life or human life itself, in order to maximize profits?
Yes (it has happened in the past.)

So, the question boils down to this: is it right for health care to be the means of a business? There are certain commodities that we have that are defensibly commodities: luxury cars, computers, beer, movies, etc. These are things that are not essential to human life, so skimming a buck off of them shouldn't really raise any alarms. However, does it really seem right, in that gut feeling, intuitive way, to make PROFIT off of providing life saving health care to individuals? Does it really seem right to make money off of the sick? Is it right to tell a person they're going to die simply because there's no immediate profit to be made off of their living? If I saw a man bleeding on the road and told him I'd only call for help if he paid me $10 you would be appalled, I'm sure. I don't see how the current health care system is significantly different from that.

If a rich man and a poor man get the same disease, is really part of America's fundamental ideals that the rich man, who can afford the life saving surgery, live while the poor man dies?

I hear the remark, "I don't want politicians interfering in my life," or some variation. I take it to be the case that these people are perfectly satisfied with having CEO's, lawyers, and accountants interfering in their lives. Because that what this all really boils down to.

Who do you trust less: politicians or CEO's, lawyers, and accountants? Because ONE of those two groups is going to be running our health care whether we like it or not and I hope to have demonstrated (at least, theoretically) why one of those groups not merely untrustworthy, but downright inhuman, scum sucking, hell spawns (hint: I'm talking about the CEO's, lawyers, and politicians.)

One last word, for those of you who lay awake at night fretting over the encroaching socialism that seems to be knocking at your door, I'm afraid you've been hornswoggled, duped, tricked, lied to. You're being used, like a cow who's been taught to herd her kin into the slaughterhouse. Take a moment, sit quietly with your fear and think, think really, really hard about the situation.

Existentialism: The Curious Case of Phineas Gage

To celebrate the unearthing of the first known photograph of Phineas Gage, I thought it'd be prudent to talk about him a little bit. Gage was a railroad foreman in the mid 19th century. During an accident a 3 ft. railroad spike was driven through his head, entering right under his left cheekbone and protruding through his skull, obliterating one or both of his frontal lobes. Miraculously he survived without any significant physical or mental impairment. However, prior to the accident Gage was a family man and a good Christian, afterward though, he became physically abusive to his friends and family, began drinking, gambling, and stealing. To the people who once new him, Gage was a wholly unrecognizable person after his accident.

In essence, Gage had his frontal lobe destroyed and, as a result, his entire personality changed. What does the frontal lobe do, then? First off, only mammalian brains have a frontal lobe, further, primates have the largest and most evolutionarily advanced frontal lobes. This part of the brain doesn't reach full maturation in humans until about the age of 25. For instance, onset of schizophrenia, (which typically occurs in the late teens/early twenties is related poor myelination (nerve connection formation) in the frontal lobe). Nuerologists observe that the frontal lobe is primarily responsible for social and existential activity in a human being. Our ability to empathize, recognize proper social conduct, censor our actions and speaking in accordance to the sensitivities of others, making moral choices, anticipate consequences for our actions, form long-term goals and actualizing those goals, and emotional memory. Basically it is the go-to part of the brain for all of our societal living needs.

You can see why, when Gage lost this part of his brain, he became the man he did. So what does Gage teach us about how we view ourselves? I've noticed that people tend to regard the brain organ differently than other organs: for instance, if the heart is removed, then blood will no longer pump, if the lungs are removed, then air will not be taken in, if the frontal lobe is removed, then we become sociopaths. Perhaps the difference in the way regard the former two versus the latter is that the former are autonomic (they occur without our conscious control) whereas when we find ourselves empathizing with someone, we feel we're somehow "doing it".

Does Gage's case study suggest that our capacity for empathy and such is not really something we "do" any more than we "do" cause our blood to pump? This question points to an even bigger and more important one: to what extent can we claim responsibility for any of our mental endeavors or any of our personality traits at all? If it's the case that I could remove certain portions of my brain and thereby effect my personality, then it must be the case that my personality determined by the physical contents of my brain. I am my brain.

This is a classic and rather insoluble problem in philosophy. On the one hand we have a certain sense of responsibility with regards the type of people we are. For instance, I prefer rooms that are painted light blue, this is part of who I am. On the other hand, if the above argument is true, then I could remove some certain part(s) of my brain and find that I no longer prefer rooms that are painted light blue. Take poor Gage's case, he, unfortunately, had the part of his brain removed that caused him to love his wife and family, hence he was no longer able to do so.

Well, all of what I've said so far is true, as far as I can tell (if it isn't then that spells pretty bad news for the nueropharmacuetical industry.) But, that doesn't mean I particularly like it. One caveat is that neurologists have demonstrated that the brain, like muscles, is capable of growing and developing. If one exercises their capacity for empathy then more dendrite and myelein connections tend to form, same with any other basic motor skill development. Who and what you are is not necessarily static, you can develop yourself through mental exercise (or pills, I suppose).

There's still more important things to be written because of Phineas Gage, but this'll do for now.

Metaphysics: Painting by Numbers (A Summary)

So... I thought that I'd just put up a brief summary of my last post, sans supporting details and verbosity. I probably ought to have put up a summary at the same time, but better late than never.

Language is a representational tool, for instance, "That is a chair," is really a sentence token for something like, "That object matches the criteria for being referred to as a chair according to our agreed upon conventions." So, what a chair IS, is actually just an object that contains a semi-ambiguous set of qualities. The word chair refers to a concept rather than an object, it refers to the list of qualities that an object necessarily has in order to be validly referred to as a chair. The art of speaking and conversing relies on the presupposition that the difference between concepts and objects are functionally negligible. That is to say that even though the word chair refers explicitly to only the concept of chair, it doesn't really matter, the conversation can go on.

So what about non-object based words, like truth or cause? Neither of those two words refer to any objects in the world, but like object words are merely concepts, just not anchored to anything external. Well, words like truth and cause function like mathematical symbols like + and =, they allow mathematics to occur. Without + and = then a 2 and a 3 are rather uninteresting and can't do much, but 2 + 3 = 5 and you have something quite amazing. Raw numbers, like raw objects, unmended by mediating concepts, serve little functional purpose for the human mind. We require these mediating concepts (e.g. +, =, truth, cause, and etc.) as grease in order for objects and numbers to do work.

What's the big payoff then? The world we live in is colored by linguistic equations, "That is a chair," is not relevantly different than a mathematical equation (2 + 3 = 5). While objects do actually exist, they are not identical to our concepts of them, the concepts are on our end, so "chairs" don't actually exist outside of us, even though the object of reference does. Likewise, truth, cause, and other functional mediators serve only as that, truth and cause don't actually exists external to us and to language, in essence "There is no truth," is valid if one is referencing the reality that exists outside of our linguistic reality.

Metaphysics: Painting By Numbers

I know that it's been a while since my last post, but hey, it's summer, hence this is the laziest post yet. I am posting the paper I presented at the 2008 Midwest Philosophy Conference entitled "Painting by Numbers". Posting this kind of violates some of my self imposed rules for this blog in that, a.) it's really long, b.) it's technical and verbose, and c.) it's flowery as all hell. So if you don't read this, I won't blame you.

However, this paper does represent some of the core features my metaphysical foundation, upon which I stand and do most of the philosophy you've read here in the past. So without further ado...



I should think it difficult to appreciate the delicacy and, perhaps, the aesthetic quality that life possesses, if we leave living wrapped in endless and superfluous layers. It has been poetically charged that philosophers would clip an angel's wings or unweave a rainbow, implying that the philosopher would just as soon smash a thing of beauty to discover what makes it beautiful rather than just appreciate it for what it is. Should our quest for truth break truth in the process? Maybe, though, what becomes clipped, unwoven, or breaks as a result of unrelenting philosophical inquiry wasn’t really worth it to begin with, maybe they were just distractions seeking to pacify inquiry. Maybe true value and beauty resides within a thing's resilience, through all manner of rigorous inquisition, a thing still whole and intact amongst the ruin and rubble of angels and rainbows would perhaps be greater and more beautiful.

Using various texts an inquisition of sorts will be preformed upon what we take to be the relational balance between reality and sense reality. For our purposes the two will be referred to as the metaphysic and epistemic worlds respectively. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate certain aspects of the relation of the two worlds in hopes of peeling away at some of the current conceptions to get at something more resilient.

The first step of this inquest is the call for revisions of certain ideas taken for granted. This will be best done in two parts 1) we will use Nietzsche as a paradigm of understanding of the nature and influence of language and 2) we will turn to a text which shows the way in which science demands this revision of logic. In so doing we will finally turn to an alternative philosophical idea which attempts to reconcile the delicacy between the epistemic and metaphysic worlds and hopefully provide something substantial and capable of weathering harsh inquiry.
In Truth and Lie in an Extramoral Sense, Nietzsche paints a vivid picture of what he takes the nature of language to be. The frequent criticism of this writing by Nietzsche is how he can make a claim about truth that is, in itself, a claim that there is no truth . The reason why this piece by Nietzsche is chosen as paradigmatic is because it is the most clear example of the way in which metaphysics and epistemology transcend each other and a failure to understand this circular transcendence is what has led to a failure to understand Truth and Lie and subsequently enormous amounts of frustration on the part of philosophers.
There is an impenetrable disunity in human experience. It is physically impossible for you and I to look at a flower in the numerically same way. I cannot, even if I stole your eyes and shoved them into my head, replicate your experience of looking at a flower, nor, if I removed your brain and placed it in my skull along with your eyes. No amount of adjusting angles or positions or any other methods would work. I would demand that for a duplication of one person’s experience of viewing a flower to another’s there would have to be an entire replication of that spatio-temporal moment. Bottom line, it’s not possible. So that’s where language comes in. Through the adaptiveness of language I can look at a flower, point to it, and say, “That’s a flower”. The person to whom I am speaking will no doubt agree, despite the disunity of our experiencing the flower. Truthfully, this disunity is not a very large one. The differences of experience are subtle ones, differing only slightly from one person to another. But these differences are enough to justify the invention of languages. Suppose, for a moment, that we did all have one collective mind in which all experience was unified from person to person, then there would be no need for language to bridge the gap of disunity.

Nietzsche’s concept of language and truth as a mobile army of metaphor slides in nicely to fill in the experiential gap. He stipulates that language is fundamentally arbitrary, that any utterance is merely a token for a common, societal understanding. My uttering, “That’s a flower” is the token of something like this “I am seeing, from my numerically unique perspective, a thing which you and I conventionally accept as being a flower and am relating this visual experience to you.” Never and nowhere in nature do we find flowers, as we call them. We find objects in the world that adhere to a certain set of traits, given a degree of similarity of these traits we lump them up under the linguistic net of the word flower. The point Nietzsche is making is that there really aren’t any flowers, just the word and concept of flower. He is accusing us of confusing our word and concept of flower with what is actually out there in the world. Not totally unlike Quinne’s attack on empiricism. Language is a net that we throw over the world in order to caste it into easy to organize categorical terms. These categorical types are completely artificial and have no real empirical basis on the world. Any similarity found is found only in property ascribing which is, itself, a matter of arbitration. In saying that there are no flowers, in no way is the existence of things out in the world being denied, merely that we would be fooling ourselves into believing that our concept of flower is what’s out there in the world.
Now that we’ve gotten that out of the way we can focus on the criticism leveled against Nietzsche. The point Nietzsche makes about truth is an epistemic/metaphysic claim in which they transcend each other circularly. He understood this circle and felt comfortable making a claim in light of it without justification. The claim, “There is no truth” seen only in epistemic terms is a contradiction, that is, how can that statement be true if it is actually true, but tempered by metaphysics can be understood for what it is. Truth is a mere concept, more flimsy, in fact, than the concept of flowers. At least with flowers we could go out and find, touch, and smell what we call flowers, but truth cannot be smelled. Like a currency with no store of value, truth is substantial only because most of us believe and agree it is. Consider then that concepts like truth or cause (which will be addressed later) function like a plus sign (+) or equals (=) sign. These mathematical signifiers bridge the conceptual gap between numbers as merely existent entities and functional entities. Because of the (+) and (=) signs I can take the numbers 2 and 3 and relate them in a way that transcends their individual qualities, e.g. 2 + 3 = 5. However, note that the (+) and (=) signs themselves serve no existential function but rather act as bridges between existential entities. So, searching for truth, as a thing beyond a concept is futile. There is no truth, per se, there are no flowers. The critics of Nietzsche here are the ones who are pushing cogency out of the window by failing to understand the duality of the claim. It is this precise duality that we must pay careful attention to.


“So stop the sun and the stars, and start up the Earth. The Sun’s motions, which we so plainly see are illusory: the movement is on our end.”
C.L. Hardin, Color for Philosophers, pg 91


Now that we’ve introduced the topic of the metaphysic/epistemic duality lets flesh it out in hopes of getting the clear picture that is being painted. What is important to understand in this duality is the role of science. Through science we can find out what is actually going on in the world versus what is going on in our minds. The contents of the distinction are thus: the metaphysical aspect of the world is the world outside of and independent of us. This is the world that persists even when we all die. “And when it is all over with the human intellect, nothing will have happened.” This is the world of math and science.

The other world is the epistemic world. The world colored by categorizations and truths. What bridges the two worlds I will refer to as the act of imagination. Imagination, in this sense, merely refers to a cognitive leap or interpretation of the sense data that we are bombarded with. This act of imagination colors the world in the epistemic way whereas the metaphysic world is the world of seamless data. The metaphysic and the epistemic world supervene on each other through the act of imagination, the epistemic being reducible to the metaphysic when the act of imagination is removed. It is this removal process that has been overlooked and underappreciated. When one frets over what, say, causation looks like he is neglecting this delicacy of reduction.

We’ll start with a colorful pop culture analogy and then move on to the science that backs it up. In the film The Matrix there exists an artificial world that is accessed by physically connecting the brain to the computer network that generates the artificial world. While people are “jacked in” to the artificial world they experience sense data in exactly the same way that it is experienced in the real world. Sights, smells, sounds, tastes all convey an indistinguishable realness. While there are people “inside” this artificial world there is usually one or more people in the “real” world called operators who monitor the activity in the artificial world from the real world by observing multiple screens that have streams of green colored symbols raining vertically downwards representing the workings of the artificial world. It is demonstrated in the film that an experienced operator can validly interpret these symbols as they correspond to the artificial world. There is a scene in which an operator points to various streaming symbols and identifies them with objects in the artificial world, “You get used to it…” he says, “I, I don’t even see the code. All I see is… a blond, brunette, red-head....” What the claim is that both the people “jacked in” and operator are seeing the same thing. The artificial world can be reduced to the streaming symbols and supervenes on it, but this does not invalidate the experiences had inside the artificial world because the act of imagination that occurs while in the artificial world occurs by necessity. The only thing the operator is missing is the act of imagination that drops out during the reduction of the artificial world to its symbolic parts. But these two accounts of the artificial world are completely valid.

Further, when a billiard ball strikes another and “causes” it to mover there are two complete and valid accounts of it that supervene on one another. First, there is the mathematical account that breaks the entire phenomenon into a balanced equation. It tracks the energy transition and is able to predict things like speed and trajectory. However, nowhere in the equation is causality implied, it is only inferred on our end. This inference is the act of imagination that categorizes the event as one of cause. This is the second account of the phenomenon; we see the ball strike the other and the other starts to move. Cause is inferred through the act of imagination by necessity. The reason for the act of imagination will be clear later on. What is important for now is that both accounts of the event are valid and do not conflict in any way whatsoever. Not only that but the two accounts depend entirely on each other for validity.

In the book Color for Philosophers C.L. Hardin, having grown weary of all the color examples in philosophy being done without a real understanding of the sciences of color, provides integral scientific data to the issue at hand. The scientific details won’t be gone over in detail, but enough will be provided. Color sight is spread across three different receptors that function in an on/off “opponent” system. Three receptors are achromatic (white/black) and chromatic (yellow/blue and red/green). “On” is typically associated with white, yellow, and red while “off” is black, blue, and green. The nature of the opponent system is such that in order to see red, the green receptors are shut off; this works for the other three as well . So when viewing a thing that has red and green parts, various red/green receptors are switched to either on or off. One red/green receptor cannot see both red and green simultaneously. So, in reality a thing really can’t be both read and green all over. The second important fact is that the eyes oscillate continually at an incredibly fast rate . Ironically, the eyes depend on high-speed differentiation in order to maintain a steady and coherent image. Studies and experiments have shown that if the oscillation of the eyes is matched then object in question begins to disappear. This can be observed by staring intently at your own eyes in the mirror and notice that other facial features begin to disappear. Lastly, there is a blind spot in each eye 16 degrees off center caused by the positioning of the nerves in the eyes. This blind spot is six degrees wide, which would be something like holding six quarters horizontally at arms length away and would be vertically comprehensive .

The implications from the last two facts about the eyes are thus: what we see is not what is seen. What we do not see is an enormous blind spot, nor does the world appear to us as a frustrating blur. It is the act of imagination that fills in the gaps in both these anomalies. The distinction between perception and conception begins to break down when a careful and scientific analysis is entertained. What are eyes actually see is vastly different than our sight experience. These anomalies can be accounted for in the metaphysical world, but the sight experience occurs in the epistemic. Both accounts are valid and supervene on one another.
With regards the opponent system of color vision, rules of logic get relegated to the epistemic category where they belong. An experiment was performed that was set up as such. There was an image presented to an observer that featured a pure red and pure green bar divided by a grayish center. This grayish center was then oscillated to match the eye frequency so that it would begin to deteriorate from the vision of the observer. The point of the experiment was to see what would happen when the data became contradictory. What would a single receptors do when told to be both on and off at the same time. Three different events occurred. 1. Subjects reported that the previously grayish area had become pebbled with red and green dots, 2. that there was a green island in a sea of red or vice versa, and 3. that there was, what could only be described, as a red/green color . The act of imagination is thus a mechanism that functions for various senses translating the data presented to us from the metaphysic into the epistemic. The world is, in essence, a giant paint by numbers picture.
So, perhaps, there is a noumena and phenomena, but, perhaps, we can know the things in themselves. Through rigorous science, we can know the noumena. I will refer to this philosophical idea as Reductive Idealism (RI). RI posits as its central thesis that there is a duality in the world, a duality of metaphysic and epistemic. This duality is bridged by the act of imagination, which takes in and categorizes the sense data that we experience. Both worlds are accessible through different means, science and experience, and are completely valid so long as one respects the imaginative reduction. The reason why the epistemic world is on the same ontological level as the metaphysic is that this act of imagination is a reflexive activity that occurs within the brain beyond our control, there is no escaping or getting outside of it. But this inability to escape the act of imagination does nothing to invalidate the accessibility of the metaphysical world through the practice of rigorous science tempered by an understanding of the reduction process.

Through RI, metaphysical or epistemic problems that have kept you up at night can hopefully evaporate. RI urges that work be done in both fields in such a way that pays careful respect to the circular transcendence of both the disciplines and to the importance of scientific information that is uncovered. It is the aim of RI to bring together the noumena and phenomena in way that unifies experience between the polarities. This is a loose and flexible idea that is capable of admitting to adjustments and changes as science shows us new things about ourselves. An embracement of change is entirely necessary as we shift into a new scientific paradigm of understanding the human body, we should not cling to brittle ideals, doing so only leads to stagnation and the type of self deception that Nietzsche so often warns us of.

Moral philosophy: Do Zombies Deserve Moral Consideration?

Ah zombies, I love them. I'm serious, I do, I love zombies. They're so much damn fun. Especially video games with zombies in them. Take Left 4 Dead, the simple premise is that you and three other people need to get from point A to point B and the only thing standing in your way is the festering horde of the undead, oh and you pretty much have unlimited ammunition. I could kill zombies for hours.
But, what if it really happened, what if I wake up tomorrow morning and the little girl down the street tries to rip out my jugular? Am I sure that it's morally acceptable to put a bullet in the brain of a cute little zombie girl?
Just so we're all on the same page, the type of zombie I'll be referring to (because there are many types of zombies out there) will be reanimated humans (either by a virus or by biblical Armageddon), are able to turn others to zombies upon exchange of fluids, and need to feed on living flesh in order to survive.
The first thing to consider is whether or not moral agency is a necessary condition for moral consideration (moral consideration is simply the act of deciding one's actions toward something else is right or wrong). Kant argued that morality only occurs between two parties able to understand the difference between right and wrong (oversimplification, I know). So, for Kant, only moral agents, get moral consideration. But, like with most of the crap (yes, crap) Kant said, I disagree. If we were to take Kant's criteria for moral consideration, then babies, retarded people, and animals deserved no moral consideration. Not only is this hypothetically repugnant, but it goes against our social intuition, we would not violently beat a baby, abuse the mentally challenged, or eat animals... err... I mean our pets, you know like cats and dogs. So, you don't have to have understanding of right and wrong in order to be treated in a morally responsible way.
But that leaves us with another problem, what exactly does qualify a thing to have moral consideration and more importantly... do zombies deserve moral consideration? So, let's determine the relevant qualities of a zombie.

1. They are reanimated human bodies
2. They sustain themselves by consuming flesh
3. They have little recognizable high order cognitive function
4. They are likely to try to kill you

Let's take each one of these relevant qualities and compare them to our collective social moral behavior.

1. Dead bodies, there are certainly no moral regulations regarding those, right? Wrong, there are not just social mores regarding the treatment of dead bodies, but there are laws about them. As social beings, we have a highly advanced set of rituals surrounding the treatment of dead bodies, in fact, some of the most profoundly disturbing images from inhuman actions revolve around the desecration of human bodies, i.e. the holocaust, Jack the Ripper, Jefferey Dahmer, etc. We have a sophisticated moral system in place preventing us from abusing dead bodies, let alone shooting them or smashing their heads.

2. Hmm... they eat flesh. Well, that obviously shows that they are barbaric and repugnant creatures deserving to be put down like the flesh eating monsters they are, certainly no creature with any sort of moral sensitivity whatsoever would even consider murdering another creature and consuming its flesh! The mere thought of a flesh eating, human creature being anywhere near us is enough to make one want to erect a barricade and load the shotguns.

3. From what I can tell, zombies run around and find stuff to eat and then they eat the stuff they find, the end. With the exception of a few movies, Fido and Day of the Dead, zombies are incapable of rational thought. So, are we able to treat things that lack cognitive function in whatever way we want? Well, two words come to mind Teri Shivo. Yes, remember the highly publicized and controversial woman in Florida who was a vegetable and her husband wanted to pull the feeding tube. In the end, he did kill her, but not without an enormous amount of social discourse. There are plenty of examples where we have trouble deciding how to treat living things that lack higher order cognitive functions.

4. Zombies want us dead, plain and simple, but so do lots of things like Islamic fundamentalists and serial killers, in fact there are all sorts of people who want to kill you and me. Does that give us the right to put a shotgun in their face? The answer is not just no, but hell no. One of the hallmarks of our advanced social system is our judicial system, in which those who want to collectively kill us can be handled in a way that's morally good (read: we lock them away, f.y.i. the U.S. is the only developed country that still employs the death penalty.)

So, 1. we don't desecrate dead bodies, 2. we don't kill people that eat flesh (otherwise most you out there would have to go), 3. we don't kill people who don't/can't think, and 4. we don't necessarily kill things that want to kill us.

Taking each quality of zombies on their own, it seems that they do deserves moral consideration according to our social practices. Oh, well...

But, wait, take all those qualities 1-4 and put them together... viola! Separately none of those qualities are sufficient for moral disregard, but if you put them together you have a sufficient condition for moral disregard.

And besides, they're zombies, if you see a zombie you kill it. I don't care if it's your mom, your dad, husband, wife, son, daughter, neighbor, priest, or garbageman. If you see a zombie, THEN YOU KNOW WHAT TO DO!

A Little Bit of Existentialism To Brighten Your Day

We are so heavily invested in words; they consume so much of our selves. Think, for just one moment, of how much time and effort is spent day in and day out in words. When what do we ask of our great authors and poets? The greatest task that our great authors and poets shoulder is the burden of making words disappear, of pulling aside the veil and revealing to us so much more than the mere phonemes present on the page. Our greatest knowledge rests not within our words, not within any paltry collection of syllables and phrases. Our greatest knowledge resides within our bodies, behind the veil of words and thought. Like clothing hides our flesh, words hide our knowledge. Poets and artist throughout our history have glorified the beauty and purity of flesh while religions and institutions have condemned and feared the power of it. We clothe ourselves with words to hide the unbearable beauty of our knowledge, of the sense our bodies have of the world. We feel like how music sounds, a rhythm and flow, ebbing like a current through ourselves. So bright we have to hide it. Our greatest knowledge lies in our greatest self.
So, in a quiet and safe place, divest yourself of your words, just a little. Pull the veil back for just a peek. Like the poet, make the words disappear and flow with wordless, gliding river of your greatest self. Don't think, but live.

Metaphysics- Time Travel: Star Trek vs. Terminator

How many movies/TV shows have time travel as a plot device? LOTS! Some do it better than others and some muck it all up (Lost). Taking the above-mentioned movies shows in account let’s see what makes for good time travel and whether or not any of the compare to what would likely happen in time travel.
Let’s start with the best of the three: Star Trek. (Spoiler Alert for those who haven’t seen the movie yet, though there’s no excuse to have not seen it yet.) In the movie, a black hole is opened by which two star ships are sucked through and sent into the past. These ships alter the course of events creating a “parallel reality” as spoken by one of the characters. After a brief scene where the crew discusses this occurrence, the aspect of time travel isn’t brought up again, which is a good thing. This is the best way to handle time travel in cinema, establish the way time travel works in this particular mythology and move on from there. Dwelling on the nuances of time travel leads only to trouble (Lost).
In Star Trek, traveling back through time and altering events creates a “split” from the “normal” timeline that does not interact with each other.
On to Terminator. We all know the story; the machines in the future send back a terminator to murder the mother of the leader of the human resistance before he is born in an attempt to preemptively end the war. However, the terminator ultimately fails and in their attempt they inadvertently cause the leader of the resistance to be conceived. What’s suggested here is that all the events in the past are determined (can’t be changed), further, that the events in the past already incorporate the intrusion of people from the future.
So, in Terminator, there is only one continuous timeline by which there can be no deviation and that all people and sentient artificial life are confined to this timeline despite being able to jump to different segments of it.
The difference between time travel in each of these movies illustrates well the difference in thought with regards time, free will, and identity. Given these two films we have to two possible theories regarding how time functions: in one scenario (Star Trek) time is like a tree branch, forking off into limitless paths or the other scenario (Terminator) time is unmoveably linear, regardless of jumping to different parts of the linear path, branching is impossible. In the former, time is undetermined, it can be changed, in the latter time is determined.
So, how does this effect free will? Well, taking a very broad definition of free will (the ability to do more than one action in a given time frame) the Star Trek thesis argues that we have a very robust free will, we can freely choose to do one action among many and that these actions affect the flow of future events. In the Terminator thesis we have a very narrow form of free will, that we are only likely able to do one action for every time frame and that decision making and deliberation are likely self-delusions.
As regards identity, the Star Trek thesis suggests that our future identity is non-finite, whereas Terminator suggests that our future identity is finite.
So, now that we’ve lain out what the central differences and their implications are on these two theories of time travel, what does science say about any of these? Well, I’ll use as my primary source, Stephen Hawking. We won’t go into whether or not time travel is feasible, but rather his discussion on what time actually is. Perhaps you remember your high school chemistry class, so when I talk about the second law of thermodynamics you might remember what that is. If you don’t, that’s ok, I’ll remind you: the second law of thermodynamics states that all systems move towards randomness, the technical term for this is entropy. Simply put, entropy is the reason why messes don’t clean themselves, why the Mona Lisa is falling apart, why you’re going to die someday. Literally, the universe is falling apart, nothing lasts, and everything is struggling towards the most random state of existence. This is lucky for us, the most random state for, say… oxygen molecules is to be as dispersed throughout our atmosphere as possible, we’d be in big trouble if all the oxygen in the world decided to hover over Alaska, exclusively.
So, what does randomness have to do with time? Well, Hawking argues that entropy points in one direction, toward randomness, and that time always points with entropy. This makes sense, if you think about it, we get older as time passes, as time passes we get older, getting older is merely the process of our bodies breaking down, undergoing entropy. Hawking argues that if entropy went in reverse, we would likely experience time in reverse, under this view, time doesn’t really exist, what we call “time” is actually just us following along the course of decay.
Where does all of this lead us? If you read my post regarding identity continuity, you may guess which of these theories I endorse. We are not temporally whole beings at any given moment; our temporal identity stretches from our beginning to our end. Think of entropy as gravity and think of yourself as being in a free fall from an airplane, regardless of whether or not you struggle or wag your arms, you’re going to continue going in one direction and you’re eventually going to hit the ground.
I’ll illustrate my conclusion with one of my favorite examples. Let’s say you and I are golfing and I have to make a one foot put. Unfortunately for me, I got cocky and miss the put. Angrily I tell you that I “Could have made that put,” upon which you respond, “No I couldn’t have.” One of us is right and it’s not me. I could put the ball in the exact same spot and sink it 100 times and not have demonstrated that I “Could have made that put.” Why not? Because in order to validate that claim I would have to reverse the flow of entropy and restore the universe to the exact same state it was in when I missed the put. But in so doing, I would have to restore my state of mind to the cocky state of mind from which I missed the shot. I can’t make that shot because I didn’t make that shot.
Time doesn’t branch, the past cannot change because it did not change, and once I, or anyone else, do something, that something is fixed and immobile, such is entropy. Now, I am not going to claim that this sufficiently disproves the doctrine of free will, that I’ll leave for another post (I think I can show that free will doesn’t exist, it’s just going to be really long.)
So, if John Connor has been born, there’s nothing those damn machines can do about it.

Talkback- Economic Philosphy: Why You've Been Right

mister_pfister said...

I think you are overlooking the economic principle of voluntary exchange. In a free market two parties walk away from an exchange better off. There's no exploitation involved here. At no point was violent force used to secure any of those transactions (unless the laborers belonged to a union) and so everyone from the laborer, to the entrepreneur, to the consumer all walked away from their respective transactions better off than they had started.

Free markets are always just because of this simple principle. Marxism, conversely, is utterly unjust because you don't keep the fruits of your labor (in this instance, the wage you are paid by the entrepreneur) but are instead forced to hand them over for redistribution by a governing entity in whatever way THEY see fit, which is almost always in an inefficient way.

And people forget that the entrepreneur is the entity who is shouldering the risk. He is freely exchanging his money for labor in the hopes that what he is producing will earn him a profit. If he pays $90 in labor for that bread but consumers decide they don't want to pay more than $80 for that bread (perhaps because a competitor found a more efficient way to make bread and make his workers more productive and thus produces it at a lower cost), that entrepreneur loses $10 because he already paid for the agreed-to wages and now couldn't sell it for a profit.

The price you are paying of $110 instead of the actual cost of $90 means that the opportunity cost (that is, what you sacrifice to get something) is $20. If you're not a bread maker and lack the stock of capital to efficiently make the bread yourself, I imagine $20 is worth it if you lose more than $20 worth of your productive time trying make something you don't specialize in. Otherwise, you're essentially reverting to a barter system where every man, woman, and child is forced to be not only a blacksmith or a cobbler, but also a tailor, a baker, a farmer, and a lot of other things they probably aren't as good at.

Capitalism is only a paradox to those who don't understand the fundamental principles of economics and instead would prefer to perpetuate class warfare through the manipulation of collective ignorance.

Excellent response! If you'll allow me to summarize your points:

1. Capitalism is just because all three parties: entreprenuer, laborer, and consumer are all "better off" in the end and no violent coercion is used.

2. Marxism is unjust because a large entity (the government or whatnot) forcibly takes wages and/or profits and redistributes them.

3. The entreprenuer deserves his profit on account that he or she is shouldering the risks of free market fluctuations.

4. That the premium the consumer pays is justified as a part of luxury of the division of labor.

Let's get 2. out of the way first. I don't actually advocate Marxist economics. I'll admit that I lack the intimacy necessary to pass judgement on Marxism (have you every seen Das Capital, that book is freaking huge, even by my standards.) But, I do understand his interpretation and answer to the Aristotilian econonmic paradox and that is merely what I'm appealing to. Though, I do have very strong socialist tendencies that extend far beyond the typical socialist charicature that most people have.

As for 1. People's particular feelings about a situation is not a good indicator of whether a situation is just. Assume that my point is true: that captialism is unjust; further assume that most people have no other experience with any other economic system and that their entire lives they've been told that capitalism is just, then it is perfectly plausible that upon entering a capitalistic transaction they'll have positive feelings about it. There are countless, and I mean countless other examples I could muster that demonstrate that peoples feelings about something does not necessarily indicate the justice value of any situation.

As for 4. I alread covered that in the original post, the premium for division of labor is paid by the consumer in the form of the wages paid to the laborer. You're right in that I would rather pay extra for a pair of shoes I didn't have to cobble myself, but this extra ought to cover the wages of the cobbler only, otherwise I'm being ripped off, I'll show why in convering 3., the most important point you bring up.

As for 3. I do not deny that the entreprenuer is shouldering a risk when he invests, in fact, it would be absurd to deny that. The question, then, is whether or not this risk justifies his exacting profit. First of all, we have to understand that value is created only through human labor. For example a mountain full of gold ore is has absolutely no value until people go in and extract it. A pile of grain is worthless unless someone converts it to bread. The list goes on. In effect, objects, by themselves, have no value until we imbue it with value via our labor. So, what labor does the entreprenuer contribute? None, nada, and zip. The entreprenuer does not create value.

But, you may argue that he facilitates the laborer's efforts to create value, henceforth, through logical extention (If A is B and B is C, therefore A is C) then the entreprenuer does create value, right? Further, the entreprenuer does is the only one shouldering the risk, he may loose all his money if the market turns on him, so he deserves his "wage" (read: profit), right?

No and No, that's no to both rhetorical questions. Here's why: both situations orginate from within the free market system. The entreprenuer's involvement in the value making process is a product of the system of the free market. In essence, the involvement of the entreprenuer is NOT NECESSARY, but arbitrary and mandated by the system. Same goes for the "risk". The risk is a product of the free market system and is there, not out of necessity, but arbitrarily. NO SYSTEM CAN JUSTIFY ITSELF FROM WITHIN! The arguement presented in 3. is SELF REFERENTIALLY INCOHERENT, this just means that any system must seek its justifcation from a source other than itself, if you need qualification on this then go to wikipedia and type in "Liar's Paradox" or "Goedel's Incompleteness Theorum", what I'm argueing here has been proven mathematically by Geodel.

Capitalism remains unjust because the appeals to its just nature rely on assumptions from within the system, not from without, which, just so you know, doesn't work. A final example for this point. Let's say I write a manual on how to torture people and in this manual I state that: "All of the above methods of torture are just." Now when I get taken to court for writing this manual on how to torture people, I calmly explain that these torture methods are just because it says so in the manual. Do you see why you can't appeal to something within a system as its justification?

Excellent comment, please keep them coming.

Best regards,
Andrew

Comments are Fixed

I fixed the comment ability, so feel free to write whatever you want!

Economic Philosophy: Why You’ve Been Right

Most people that I know, that is, that I choose to spend time with are suspicious of capitalism. This suspicion is not unfounded and here’s a brief explanation of why.
It goes all the way back to the ancients 2500 years ago, specifically to Aristotle. While strolling through the market he noticed something that made no sense. It goes like this:
Someone (the capitalist) has money (M) and buys some goods or commodities (C); in this case we’ll say he’s bought some grain. The capitalist then pays someone a wage to produce bread from grain. Now, the baffling part is that when the capitalist sells his new bread he gets more money than he started with (M’). This occurs even after you factor out the wage he paid the worker and the money initially invested.
Mathematically: the capitalist starts with $100, he pays $90 for the grain, pays $10 for the labor, sells his bread and ends up with $110.

The money is turned into a commodity then turned back into money, more money.

M -> C -> M’

This seems perfectly normal to us, but Aristotle, being a rigid logician, realized that having more money at the end was impossible, YOU CAN’T MAKE SOMETHING FROM NOTHING! How could more money come out of the system than went in?
Nearly 2500 years later, Marx answers his question. Someone in the process is getting totally screwed over. It is either the laborer or the consumer, i.e. either the capitalist is underpaying the laborer for the value of his work or he’s charging the consumer more than the value of the product. There, are of course, a plethora of subtlety and nuance that I’m overlooking, but that’s the gist of it.
What’s most striking about this revelation is that this is the essence of capitalism. It’s not that capitalism is bad in the hands of bad men, but unfairness and exploitation are fundamental parts of what defines capitalism. Bottom line:
YOU CANNOT HAVE A JUST CAPITALISM!
If you did, it would be something other than capitalism. Now, the most common response I get to this line of reasoning is something like this:
“Well, the extra money (M’) comes from the premium of the division of labor.”
That is, we ought to pay more for the value of a commodity because we didn’t have to do it ourselves. If it weren’t for the capitalist and his initial investment then I’d have to make my own bread, does not the capitalist deserve a “bonus” for initiating this process?
This seems to make sense doesn’t it? Well, it doesn’t. The value of the division of labor is already present in the M -> C -> M’ equation in the form of the wages paid to the worker. The worker is the one who creates the value, converts grain to bread, and is paid for the value of his work, also, the actual commodity, itself, has a value attribute attached to its initial cost and then its price after conversion to bread.
QED. I could go and buy $90 worth of grain and turn it into bread myself or I could buy $100 dollars of bread made from the $90 worth of grain, I AM ALREADY PAYING THE PREMIUM FOR THE DIVISION OF LABOR. Paying $110 is pure exploitation of the consumer. Alternately, the capitalist could charge the consumer only $100 but only pay the worker $2, thereby skimming his profits from what the worker should rightfully have.
Again, the point is that a just capitalism is a paradox, much like a circle with four right angles, it can’t exist. So if you’ve always had a lingering suspicion of capitalism, you’ve been right.

Video Games and Philosophy Episode 1: Final Fantasy VI

This post serves the singular purpose of marrying my two favorite hobbies: video games and philosophy. As denoted by the title, this is only the first of many to come, so I thought I’d start with a game from my childhood.
If you were a geek, like I was growing up, then the Christmas season of 1994 was very, very exciting for you, because you likely got a copy of Final Fantasy VI under your tree (or Final Fantasy III as it was in the US). I’ll tell you right now that this was and still is a hell of a game, with dozens of characters, all of which get a significant amount of development, an epic story, and sidequests and Easter eggs spanning many hours of gameplay.
The philosophical aspect of the game comes mainly from the main villain, Emperor Gestahl (yes, my online pseudonym comes from a transliteration of the name when it was originally ported to the states in ’94 which, in turn, is a transliteration of the German word gestell). In the game there is an evil empire attempting to resurrect ancient technology that mythologically ravaged the world a thousand years ago, the protagonists that you play as are part of a rebel alliance called The Returners who are try to stop Gestahl and his empire from repeating the mistakes of the past.
In this fantasy world there exists creatures called Espers that are depicted as anthropomorphic nature spirits, they literally are the essence of nature enshrined within a corporeal body. The empire seeks to capture these Espers, place them in pneumatic tubes and suck the energy out of them thereby harnessing their life force in order to power their “Magitek” army, The Returners, of course, realize this is exactly how the world was nearly destroyed 1000 years ago and try to stop them.
At least one of the writers at Squaresoft knew his German philosophy well, in naming the ruler of this evil empire Gestahl, he or she infused the game with a potent amount of philosophical juice. If you don’t believe me that this is intentional then go and play Final Fantasy VII in which there is a side character actually named Heidegger. The name Gestahl comes from the German word gestell, which roughly translates into “enframing”. The term was coined by the legendary (yes, legendary) existentialist philosopher, Martin Heidegger in his essay “The Question Concerning Technology”, one of my favorite all time philosophical essays.
In this essay, Heidegger muses about that fact that the Greek word “techne” (root for the modern word technology) was intimately tied to the Greek word “poesis” (root for the modern word poem). To the ancients, technological advancements were fundamentally considered art; it was that the craftsman was revealing something that was inside of the materials he would use to create his “techne”. Heidegger noted that there was something harmonious about the harnessing of technology to the ancients; it wasn’t about exploitation of naturally occurring resources, but rather the revealing of their nature in man’s hands. But looking around the early to mid 20th century he realized that technology was both no longer an art form, but also was exploitive. He uses the example of a windmill vs. a hydroelectric power plant. The windmill, an ancient technological device, sits benignly in an open plain, merely utilizing the path of the wind for our own purposes without destroying or taking away from this natural force, whereas a hydroelectric power plant involves damming up the river, diverting its course, and severely impacting the surrounding environment. In the former instance we remain in touch with the fundamental value of nature, in the latter case we see nature as a means to our own ends.
This is what gestell, or enframing, means. When we enframe, we fail to see nature’s value as it is, but only see its use value. For example, one who enframes sees a forest as merely lumber, a waterfall as hydroelectric power, or open plains as agro-farms or landfills. Heidegger notes that this way of viewing the world, not only has serious environmental consequences, but also has serious consequences to our existential relationship to our environment. Objectifying nature is only one step away from objectifying ourselves; it’s a slippery slope. He argued that the shift in how we view our “techne”, i.e. away from art and toward utility, marked a shift in the way we view ourselves. He chief concern was that, soon, we would enframe our own bodies; to a large extent we already have.
Back to Final Fantasy VI, note that Emperor Gestahl’s entire world dominating plot was centered around taking the Espers (the corporeal embodiment of nature) and converting them into raw energy, killing them in the process. Gestahl is the literary embodiment of enframing; note too that this enframing had already occurred once in this fantasy world’s history and HAD ALMOST DESTROYED THE PLANET! The philosophical message is clear, enframing is not just bad, but it is the “bad guy”, the one we should be rallying against, as the efforts of enframing will lead us to destruction.
Also, one of the main protagonists is a woman who is the child of a human mother and Esper father and her name is… Terra, who, at the beginning of the game, is brainwashed by Gestahl and used as the general for his army only later to be freed from her mind control and fight to thwart Gestahl. The message there: using the Earth (Terra) for the ends of enframing is a perversion of its natural inclination, i.e. we must “brainwash” the Earth in order for it participate in enframing.

Caveat Lector, if you will.

I felt that it's worth saying that in the post below and most of my future posts, I will utterly fail to represent competing views to the ones that I espouse. This is because what I present is what I feel, after considerable deliberation, to be the most accurate, cogent, and complete philosophical theory. As with the discussion on identity below, there are many competing theories available, but the one I posted is the one I endorse.

I don't hide this failure because that is the point of this blog, I'll slog through all of the philosophical muck for you, so you don't have to, and present the best that I can find. However, this does not mean that I don't want you to disagree with me, in fact, please do, contention is the life blood of healthy discourse.

Best regards,
Andrew

Metaphysics and Pop Culture: Identity Continuity in Sci-Fi TV

Fans of either Battlestar Galactica or Dollhouse should be familiar with the concept of life extension via body switching. Forgetting about the scientific probability of these types of technology, let’s look at what problems these pose to identity.
Why you should care: identity is an important question in metaphysics and perhaps one of the oldest. This question was posed by the pre-Socratics (philosophers before Socrates came on the scene 6th century B.C.), perhaps you’ve heard the old adage: you can’t step in the same river twice; Parmenides said that over 2500 years ago. So, apparently identity and, more importantly, self-identity has been important to us for a long time.
In fact, many and I mean many aspects of our social system rely the concept of identity including our entire criminal justice system and religious ideology, just to name a few. What is at the core of our collective belief on identity is that identity perseveres over time: that objects remain identical to themselves even as time passes. This is a concept that we all take for granted and have likely never questioned nor thought much about at all, thanks to Battlestar and Dollhouse, we have a nice platform on which to investigate.
A quick synopsis for those who haven’t seen Battlestar: there is a race of humanoid robots called Cylons, who, upon death have their consciousness downloaded into a new body waiting for them. These bodies are physically identical to their former one. Cylons claim to have overcome death by this method. As for Dollhouse: there is an organization that has developed the technology to store and transmit the contents of a person’s brain and can then upload that brain into a someone else’s body. A person can have their brain “backed up” on a hard drive and then uploaded into a new body upon their death.
We’ll talk about Dollhouse first, because it is the more clear-cut case of non-continuous identity. Let’s say that I have a back up of my brain created and then immediately afterward I die from a sudden aneurysm. The Dollhouse technicians upload my backed up brain into a host and viola, I am risen. This “new” me contains all of my memories, personality traits, and cognitive abilities. You can go up to the “new” me and ask, “Well, did it work?” and I would say, “Yes, I am alive again!” All seems well, doesn’t it? I may be “in” a new body, but it’s still me, right?
Actually no, the me that died is certainly me, but the me that woke up in the new body is someone or something that woke up for me, not me, myself. To illustrate my point, suppose I had my brain backed up, but then the technician immediately put the back up into a new host, while I was still alive. So there is me, as I am, and a person with my brain who thinks they are also me, if we had an argument about who the real me is, who do you think would win? Obviously this person who just happens to have a copy of my brain in their head is not actually me, whether they think so and whether I am alive or dead.
The same problems occur in Battlestar Galactica, the only difference is that the new host body is identical to the old one and that the transference only occurs upon death, but, like with Dollhouse, the same counter-examples could easily be modified to show similar disparities in continuous identity.
The payoff to this is: my identity is MORE than a: having my brain and b: holding the belief that I am me!
So what is to be done now? It seems that having your own brain and believing that you’re identical to yourself are not sufficient criteria for being identical to yourself. (For another really interesting case study in identity go to wikipedia and type in: Ship of Theseus.) To make this even more complicated consider the fact that I got a haircut this morning. Yesterday, my hair was long, but today my hair is short, though I still consider myself to be identical to myself. How could I, though, I am clearly different today than I was yesterday. What if it wasn’t a haircut, what if I had and arm cleaved off in an accident or a part of my brain removed? Our bodies are constantly changing, in fact if you’re anywhere near my age, then there is not a cell in your body left over from when you were born, so if even on the cellular level there is no remnant from when you were conceived, how can you possibly hold on to the notion that you are and have always been identical to yourself?
There is no one singular core (I’ve looked) of us that never changes over time that we can point at and say, “Aha, so long as I have that I am assured of my identity.” Every part of us is in a continual state of change. So the whole concept of identity is a fraud, right?
When we execute someone for murder twenty years after the crime, are we punishing the right person? After twenty years, mitosis would have replaced every cell that was present when that person committed the crime, in essence the murderer is long gone forever and we are executing an innocent man. Just like with Dollhouse the death row inmate believes he is identical to himself from twenty years ago, but that belief doesn’t justify the truth of the statement and he has a brain that was the same brain of the murderer from twenty years ago, but that doesn’t justify identity either. What’s even worse is assuming he didn’t commit the murder twenty years ago, but one minute ago. Surely the murderer from one minute ago is identical to himself one minute later, right? But we live in a constant flux of time; physics teaches us that a lot can go on in a minute.
If I took a holistic snapshot of myself at an exact moment of time and then again one second later there would huge differences. Old cells would have died and new ones formed, the electrochemical state of my brain would have changed, the level of radiation passing through my body from space would have changed, the concentration of oxygen in my blood would be different, etc, etc, etc. Basically every single moment is completely and irreplicateably different from another moment:
WE ARE NEVER EVEN IDENTICAL WITH OURSELVES FROM MOMENT TO MOMENT!
Unless we acknowledge that we are more than just physical entities (and no I’m not about to start talking about souls). We are temporal entities too: we are not three-dimensional creatures; rather, we are four-dimensional creatures.
Take, for instance, my elbow, which is a part of my physical body. It is not me, but it is part of a physical continuum that is me. I couldn’t point to my elbow and say that is my, but I could say that it is part of me. That’s how it is for time too. The entirety of my physical body at any particular point of time is a part of the larger me, not me as a whole. The me as a whole stretches back to the point at which I came into being and ends at when I go out of being. The entirety of me is very large in time and the me you can see at any given moment is, like my elbow, merely part of a larger continuum. Identity therefore only exists as a continuum in time, which allows for physical change because our being in time does not ever change. I am identical with myself at now, birth, and death, because each state is part of the same continuum.
This explanation for identity allows for properties of objects to change but remain auto-identical and accounts for the problems with Battlestar and Dollhouse, in both of those TV shows there was a break in both that temporal and physical continuity.
The more robust understanding we have for our own identity, the more enriched and capable we are of being present in our own life. With this concept of identity in mind, you can rest assured that when you are punished for past actions, you are being punished justifiably.

Best regards,
Andrew

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Welcome to The New Lyceum

"The question has been forgotten," is how Heidegger opens his opus Being in Time. I share his sentiment (though he was arguably talking about ancient Greek metaphysics) in that philosophy was originally concerned with improving life and living well. In my experience, the discipline has become reclusive, relegating itself to university classrooms and wrapping itself in elusive vernacular. While understanding the metaphysical substratum of the universe and delineating epistemic transcendental presuppositions may not seem that important to a good life, I believe they are. So I see my task as bringing to those who don't feel like swimming through massive philosophical tomes the enrichment that they bring.
Living well includes so many aspects of life that I hope to cover an enormous range of topics, facilitated through the lens of philosophy.

Best regards,
Andrew